The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions, the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. For many valuation spaces, computing the allocation and payments of the VCG mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to non-additive bids. These bounds show that increased expressiveness can give rise to additional equilibria of poorer efficiency. 5:2 P. Dütting et al.
INTRODUCTION
The goal of mechanism design is to devise mechanisms consisting of an allocation rule and a payment rule that implement desirable outcomes in strategic equilibrium. A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that any equilibrium outcome of any mechanism can be obtained as a truthful equilibrium of a direct-revelation mechanism. However, as has been pointed out in prior work [9] , the revelation principle says nothing about the computational complexity of such a truthful direct-revelation mechanism.
In the context of combinatorial auctions, the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [8, 20, 37] . Unfortunately, for not go through any of the existing smoothness techniques. To capture this type of argument, we introduce a novel smoothness notion that we refer to as relaxed smoothness, and show that it also implies bounds for coarse correlated equilibria. We thus obtain an upper bound of 4 on the Price of Anarchy with respect to coarse correlated equilibria and restrictions from subadditive valuations to additive bids. We complement our upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy with respect to coarse correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria with a lower bound of 2.4 that applies to pure Nash equilibria and restrictions to OXS bids. Together with the upper bound of 2 on the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria and restrictions to additive bids of Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [3] , this shows a strict increase in the Price of Anarchy as we transition from additive bids to the next larger class OXS.
Finally, as a step toward understanding the complexity of finding an equilibrium of the VCG mechanism with restricted bids, we show that for subadditive valuations and additive bids, deciding whether there exists a PNE is N P-hard.
Our analysis leaves a number of interesting open questions, both regarding the computation of equilibria and regarding improved upper and lower bounds. Some of these questions, in particular those regarding the computational complexity of equilibria have been addressed in follow-up work.
Related Work. The Price of Anarchy in combinatorial auctions in which agents are forced to use additive bids has been studied in References [3, 6, 17] for simultaneous second-price auctions and in References [7, 17, 22] for simultaneous first-price auctions. The case where all items are identical, but additional items contribute less to the valuation and agents are required to place additive bids has been analyzed in References [11, 26] .
Our work differs from these works in that it also considers non-additive bids, which allows to quantify the impact of expressiveness. A similar question was in parallel and, independently of us, studied by Babaioff et al. [1] . They show that some of our findings actually apply to the broader class of mechanisms that maximize declared welfare, i.e., the sum of the winning agents' bids. This includes the VCG-based mechanisms studied here but also other mechanisms such as the Walrasian mechanism.
On a technical level, what ties most of these results together is that they use the smoothness framework to prove Price of Anarchy guarantees. Smooth games were originally defined and analyzed in References [32, 33] . This work has been extended to mechanisms in Reference [35] . Our work adds to this line of work by providing an alternative smoothness notion, which gives more flexibility in choosing the deviating bids and thus more power to prove stronger bounds. Also related is more recent work by Dütting and Kesselheim [15] , which provides a purely combinatorial characterization of algorithms that lead to mechanisms with a small Price of Anarchy. Our key technical lemmas are closely related to the notion of permeability defined in this article.
The equilibrium computation question has previously been addressed in Reference [6] , who gave a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a PNE for restrictions from submodular valuations to additive bids and an exponential-time procedure for finding a PNE for restrictions from fractionally subadditive valuations to additive bids. Follow-up work showed hardness results for pure Nash equilibria [13] , for Bayes-Nash equilibria [4] , and for no-regret learning [10] . Motivated by this, Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [10] considered an alternative equilibrium concept for which polynomial-time learning algorithms exist, while Dütting and Kesselheim [16] proved welfare guarantees for game-playing dynamics that apply out of equilibrium.
An alternate (non-constructive) way of proving lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy was recently presented in Reference [34] . This work, amongst others, shows that simultaneous firstprice auctions achieve the best possible Price of Anarchy guarantee for subadditive valuations among all "simple" mechanisms.
The impact of more or less expressiveness in mechanisms was also studied in Reference [2] and References [14, 27] . The former points out that in a combinatorial auction setting the best welfare that can be achieved strictly increases with a suitably defined notion of expressiveness. The latter shows how, in sponsored search auctions, restrictions of the bid space to a subspace of the valuation space can improve the set of equilibria as a whole by eliminating low revenue equilibria. Our work complements this line of work by showing that in combinatorial auctions more expressiveness can give rise to additional equilibria of poorer efficiency.
PRELIMINARIES
Combinatorial Auctions. In a combinatorial auction there is a set N of n agents and a set M of m items. Each agent i ∈ N employs preferences over bundles of items, represented by a valuation function v i : 2 M → R ≥0 . We use V i for the class of valuation functions of agent i, and V = i ∈N V i for the class of valuation profiles of all agents i ∈ N .
where v i denotes agent i's valuation and v −i denotes the valuations of all agents other than i. We assume that the valuation functions are normalized and monotone, i.e., v i (∅) = 0 and v i (S ) ≤ v i (T ) for all S ⊆ T .
A mechanism M = ( f , p) collects bids and computes an allocation and payments. A bid b i by agent i is a bidding function b i : 2 M → R ≥0 . We use B i to denote the class of bidding functions of agent i and B = i ∈N B i for the class of possible bid profiles. We write b = (b i , b −i ) ∈ B, where b i denotes agent i's bid and b −i denotes the bids of all agents but i. The mechanism chooses the allocation according to allocation rule f : B → P(M ), where P (M ) denotes all possible partitions X of the set of items M into n sets X 1 , . . . , X n , and payments using payment rule p : B → R n ≥0 . We define the social welfare of an allocation X as the sum SW(X ) = i ∈N v i (X i ) of the agents' valuations and use OPT(v) to denote the maximal achievable social welfare. An allocation rule f maximizes declared welfare if for all bids b it chooses the allocation f (b) that maximizes the sum of the agents' bids, i.e., i
We assume quasi-linear preferences, i.e., agent i's utility under mechanism M given valuations v and bids b is
We focus on the VCG mechanism of References [8, 20, 37] 
The VCG mechanisms starts from an allocation rule f that maximizes declared welfare and computes the payment of each agent i as
As the payment p i (b) only depends on the bundle f i (b) allocated to agent i and the bids b −i of the agents other than i, we also use p i ( f i (b), b −i ) to denote agent i's payment.
If the bids are additive, then the VCG prices are additive, i.e., for every agent i and every bundle S ⊆ M we have p i (S, b −i ) = j ∈S max k i b k (j). Furthermore, the set of items that an agent wins in the VCG mechanism are the items for which he has the highest bid, i.e., agent i wins item j
. Many of the complications in this article come from the fact that these two observations do not apply to non-additive bids.
Valuation Compressions. Our main object of study in this article is valuation compressions, i.e., restrictions of the bidding space B to a subspace of the valuation space V . 1 More specifically, we consider valuation spaces V and bid spaces B from the following hierarchy due to Lehmann et al. [24] :
The class OS is the class of additive functions. The name comes from the fact that it can be expressed syntactically as ORs-of-XSs (see below). The acronym GS stands for gross substitutes and the acronym SM for submodular. The most general class in this hierarchy, CF, for complement free, is the class of subadditive functions.
The classes OXS and XOS are defined syntactically. To define them, we need the class of singleton functions, which we denote by XS. Functions from this class assign the same value to all bundles that contain a specific item and assign a value of zero to all other bundles. We also need two operators OR and XOR. The OR (∨) operator is defined as (u ∨ w )(S ) = max T ⊆S (u (T ) + w (S \ T )) and the XOR (⊗) operator is defined as (u ⊗ w )(S ) = max(u (S ), w (S )). Note that the class of functions that can be expressed as OR of XS valuations is precisely the class OS of additive functions.
The class OXS is the class of functions that can be described as ORs of XORs of XS functions and the class XOS is the class of functions that can be described by XORs of ORs of XS functions. Note that the latter class is simply the maximum over a set of additive functions. So a valuation v i from this class can be expressed by a set of additive functions
Another important class is the class β-XOS, where β ≥ 1, of β-fractionally subadditive functions. A valuation v i is β-fractionally subadditive if for every subset of items T there exists an additive valuation a i such that (a) j ∈T a i (j) ≥ v i (T )/β and (b) j ∈S a i (j) ≤ v i (S ) for all S ⊆ T . The special case β = 1 corresponds to the class XOS of fractionally subadditive valuations. It can be shown that the class CF is contained in O (log(m))-XOS (see, e.g., Theorem 5.2 in Reference [3] ). Solution Concepts. We use game-theoretic reasoning to analyze how agents interact with the mechanism, a desirable criterion being stability according to some solution concept. In the complete information model, the agents are assumed to know each others' valuations, and in the incomplete information model, the agents' only know from which (possibly distinct) distributions the valuations of the other agents are drawn. In the remainder, we focus on the complete information case. The definitions and our results for incomplete information are given in Appendix A.
The static game-theoretic solution concepts that we consider in the complete information setting are
where DSE stands for dominant strategy equilibrium, PNE stands for pure Nash equilibrium, MNE stands for mixed Nash equilibrium, CE stands for correlated equilibrium, and CCE stands for coarse correlated equilibrium.
In our analysis, we only need the definitions of pure Nash and coarse correlated equilibria.
The dynamic solution concept that we consider in this setting is regret minimization. A sequence of bids b 1 , . . . ,b T incurs vanishing average external regret if for all agents i,
where o(·) denotes the little-oh notation. The empirical distribution of bids in a sequence of bids that incurs vanishing external regret converges to a CCE (see, e.g., Chapter 4 of [31] ).
Price of Anarchy. We quantify the welfare loss from valuation compressions by means of the Price of Anarchy (PoA).
The PoA with respect to PNE for valuations v ∈ V is defined as the worst ratio between the optimal social welfare OPT(v) and the welfare SW(b) of a PNE b ∈ B,
.
Similarly, the PoA with respect to MNE, CE, and CCE for valuations v ∈ V is the worst ratio between the optimal social welfare OPT(v) and the expected welfare Eb∼B[SW(b)] of a MNE, CE, or CCE B,
It is not difficult to see that the Price of Anarchy can be arbitrarily bad even if there is only a single item for sale. As argued in the related literature, however, this requires agents to grossly overstate their values for certain bundles of items, which seems unnatural (see, e.g., Reference [17] ). We therefore impose the assumption that agents avoid such overbidding strategies by restricting the action space (and the set of possible deviations from an equilibrium bid profile)
FRACTIONALLY SUBADDITIVE VALUATIONS
We begin our analysis with valuation compressions from β-fractionally subadditive valuations to less general bids. We show an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy with respect to coarse correlated equilibria and Bayes-Nash equilibria of 2β. We also show a lower bound of 2 on the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria for valuation compressions from fractionally subadditive valuations to less general bids. We thus show that for fractionally subadditive valuations, increased expressiveness neither improves nor deteriorates the Price of Anarchy.
Upper Bounds
We establish our upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy by showing that the VCG mechanism with restricted bids is weakly smooth. Weak smoothness is a parametrized property of mechanisms that requires that for every valuation profile and every bid profile, there exists a "good" unilateral deviation for each agent. The deviations are only allowed to depend on the valuation profile, and they are considered to be good if in sum over all agents they ensure high enough utilities. [35] [35] show that a weakly (λ, μ 1 , μ 2 )-smooth mechanism achieves a Price of Anarchy of at most max (μ 1 ,1)+μ 2 λ with respect to both coarse correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria.
Definition 3.1 (Syrgkanis and Tardos
). A mechanism M = ( f , p) is weakly (λ, μ 1 , μ 2 )-smooth for λ, μ 1 , μ 2 ≥ 0 if for every valuation profile v ∈ V and bid profile b ∈ B there exists a bid a i (v) for every agent i ∈ N that does not require agent i to overbid such that i ∈N u i ((a i , b −i ), v i ) ≥ λ · OPT(v) − μ 1 · i ∈N p i ( f i (b), b −i ) − μ 2 · i ∈N b i ( f i (b)).
Syrgkanis and Tardos
Theorem 3.2. Consider running the VCG mechanism for β-fractionally subadditive valuations and fractionally subadditive bids. Then the VCG mechanism is weakly (1/β, 1, 1)-smooth.
We will prove this result with the help of two lemmas. We consider these lemmas, which show how to deal with non-additive bids, as our main technical contribution. Lemma 3.3. Consider running the VCG mechanism for β-fractionally subadditive valuations and fractionally subadditive bids. Then, for all valuations v ∈ V , every agent i ∈ N , and every bundle of items Q i ⊆ M, there exists an additive bid a i ∈ B i that only depends on Q i and v i and does not require
Consider bids b −i . Recall our notation for the maximum declared welfare that is achievable by distributing items S ⊆ M among the agents j i, which we defined to be
As the VCG mechanism selects the outcome that maximizes the sum of the bids,
As
Lemma 3.4. Consider running the VCG mechanism for β-fractionally subadditive valuations and fractionally subadditive bids. For every allocation Q 1 , . . . , Q n and all bids b ∈ B,
We
The second inequality holds due to the monotonicity of the bids. Since XOS = 1-XOS for every agent k, bid b k ∈ XOS, and set f k (b), there exists a bid a k,
As Q 1 , . . . , Q n is a partition of M, every item is contained in exactly one of the sets Q 1 , . . . , Q n and hence in n − 1 of the sets M \ Q 1 , . . . , M \ Q n . By the same argument, for every agent k and set
The claim follows by combining inequalities Equations (1) 
Applying Lemma 3.4, we obtain
Remark. Lemma 3.4 and hence Theorem 3.2 apply whenever bids are at least additive and at most fractionally subadditive. So, for instance, these results apply with OXS bids when agents are restricted to use at most k ≥ 1 XORs.
Lower Bounds
To show our lower bound on the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria, we will show that the exact same construction that is used in Reference [6] to show a lower bound of 2 for restrictions to additive bids also constitutes a PNE when agents are allowed to use more general bids. We do so by showing that for fractionally subadditive valuations the VCG mechanism satisfies a property of mechanisms known as outcome closure.
Definition 3.5 (Milgrom [27] ). A mechanism satisfies outcome closure for a given class V of valuation functions and a restriction of the class B of bidding functions to a subclass B of bidding
Milgrom [27] shows that if a mechanism satisfies outcome closure, then every PNE under B is also a PNE under B. Theorem 3.6. Consider running the VCG mechanism for fractionally subadditive valuations and a set of allowable bids that is contained in the class of fractionally subadditive functions and includes all additive functions. Then the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria is at least 2.
Proof. It suffices to show that the VCG mechanism satisfies outcome closure for V and the restriction of B to B , where B and B can be any of the mentioned classes of bidding functions. To prove this fix valuations v ∈ V , bids b −i ∈ B −i , and consider an arbitrary bid b i ∈ B i by agent i. Denote the bundle that agent i gets under (b i , b −i ) by Q i and denote his payment by
This proves that outcome closure is satisfied.
SUBADDITIVE VALUATIONS
We now turn to subadditive valuations. Our analysis from the previous section already shows that the Price of Anarchy with respect to both coarse correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria is upper bounded by O (log(m)). In this section, we introduce a new smoothness notion that allows to improve the guarantee for coarse correlated equilibria and additive bids to 4. We also present a lower bound for pure Nash equilibria and restrictions to OXS bids that shows that the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria strictly increases as we go from additive to OXS bids.
Relaxed Smoothness
Recall that weak smoothness is a parametrized property of mechanisms that requires that for every valuation profile and every bid profile, there exists a good deviation for each agent, where the deviation may only depend on the valuation profile. Our smoothness notion, which we refer to as relaxed smoothness, also allows the deviation of an agent to depend on the distribution of the other agents' bids. 
Relaxed smoothness, just like weak smoothness, implies a bound on the Price of Anarchy for both coarse correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria. We present the result for coarse correlated equilibria. The result for Bayes-Nash equilibria can be found in Appendix A. ( f 1 (b) , . . . , f n (b)). Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) be defined as in Definition 4.1. Then,
where the first equality uses the definition of
, the first inequality uses the fact that B is a CCE, and the second inequality holds because a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is defined as in Definition 4.1.
Since agents do not overbid this can be rearranged to give
For μ 1 ≤ 1, the second term on the right-hand side is lower bounded by zero and the result follows by rearranging terms. For
] to lower bound the second term on the right hand side and the result follows by rearranging terms.
Upper Bound for Additive Bids
The advantage of relaxed smoothness over weak smoothness is that it gives us additional freedom in choosing deviations for each agent. We next show how the proof technique of Feldman et al. [17] can be used to show relaxed smoothness of the VCG mechanism for restrictions to additive bids. Proposition 4.3. Consider running the VCG mechanism for subadditive valuations and additive bids. Then the VCG mechanism is relaxed (1/2, 0, 1)-smooth.
To prove this result we need two auxiliary lemmas. Lemma 4.4. Consider running the VCG mechanism for subadditive valuations and additive bids. Then for every agent i ∈ N , every bundle of items Q i ⊆ M, and every distribution B −i over the bids b −i ∈ B −i of the agents other than i there exists an additive bid a i ∈ B i that only depends on Q i and B −i and does not require agent i to overbid such that
Proof. Let ϵ > 0. Consider bids b −i of the agents −i. The bids b −i induce a price p i (j) = max k i b k (j) for each item j. Let T be a maximal subset of items from Q i such that v i (T ) < p i (T ) + |T | · ϵ. Define the truncated prices q i as follows:
The distribution B −i on the bids b −i induces a distribution C i on the prices p i as well as a distribution D i on the truncated prices q i .
We would like to consider a bid b i by agent i that is drawn from the same distribution D i as the truncated prices. To explicitly deal with ties, we will increase the bid on each item in Q i \ T by ϵ. So, to determine the bid b i we first draw b i from D i and then let b i (S ) = b i (S ) + |S ∩ Q i \ T | · ϵ for all S. We need to argue that the resulting bids are additive and that they do not entail overbidding. The first condition is satisfied because additive bids lead to additive prices, and so the truncated prices are additive. To see that the second condition is satisfied assume by contradiction that for some non-empty set
which contradicts our definition of the set T as a maximal subset of Q i for which the inequality
. By the definition of the prices p i and the trun-
Taking expectations over the prices p i ∼ C i and the truncated prices
Now recall the process by which we generate b i . Let us make the dependence on b i visible by writing b i (b i ). Next we take expectations over b i ∼ D i on both sides of the previous inequality. Then we bring the p i (Q i ) term to the right and the q i (Q i ) term to the left. Finally, we exploit that the expectation over q i ∼ D i of q i (Q i ) is the same as the expectation over
Now, using the fact that b i and q i are drawn from the same distribution D i , we can lower bound the first term on the right-hand side of the preceding inequality by
where the inequality in the last step comes from the fact that the subset
Note that agent i's utility for bid b i against bids b −i is given by his valuation for the set of items f i (b i , p i ) minus the price p i ( f i (b i , p i )). Note further that the price p i ( f i (b i , p i )) that he faces is at most his bid b i ( f i (b i , p i )). Finally, note that his bid b i (Q i ) + |Q i | · ϵ because of the way we generate b i from b i and because b i is drawn from D i . Together with inequality Equation (4) and inequality Equation (5) this shows that
Since this inequality is satisfied in expectation if bid b i is generated by drawing b i from distribution D i there must be at least one a i from the support of D i and hence a deterministic bid a i that satisfies it. The claim follows by taking ϵ → 0.
Lemma 4.5. Consider running the VCG mechanism for subadditive valuations and additive bids. Then for every partition Q 1 , . . . , Q n of the items and all bids b,
Proof. For every agent i and each item j
Hence an upper bound on the sum
Proof of Proposition 4.3. The claim follows by applying Lemma 4.4 to every agent i and the corresponding optimal bundle O i , summing over all agents i, and using Lemma 4.5 to bound
Remark. In the proof of Lemma 4.4 it is important that additive bids b −i by the agents other than i induce additive VCG payments p i (S, b −i ) = j ∈S p i (j) = j ∈S max k i b k (j). The VCG payments induced by more general bids can typically not be expressed within the same bidding language.
Lower Bound for OXS Bids
We conclude this section by proving a lower bound on the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria for restrictions to OXS bids, which is strictly larger than the corresponding upper bound for additive bids. Theorem 4.6. Consider running the VCG mechanism for subadditive valuations and a set of allowable bids that is contained in the class of fractionally subadditive functions and includes all OXS functions. Assume further that there are at least n ≥ 2 agents and m ≥ 6 items. Then for every δ > 0 there exist valuations v such that the Price of Anarchy for pure Nash equilibria is at least 2.4 − δ .
The proof of this theorem makes use of the following auxiliary lemma, which relates the maximum bid on any of the subsets of a set that are by one element smaller to the bid on the set itself. 
Proof. As b i ∈ XOS there exists an additive bid a i such that j ∈X a i (j) = b i (X ) and for every S ⊆ X we have b i (S ) ≥ j ∈S a i (j). There are |X | many ways to choose S ⊆ X such that |S | = |X | − 1 and these |X | many sets will contain each of the items j ∈ X exactly |X | − 1 times. Thus, S ⊆X, |S |= |X |−1 b i (S ) ≥ (|X | − 1) · b i (X ). For any set T ∈ arg max S ⊆X, |S |= |X |−1 b i (S ), using the fact that the maximum is at least as large as the average, we therefore have b i (T ) ≥ (|X | − 1)/|X | · b i (X ).
Proof of Theorem 4.6. There are two agents and six items. The items are divided into two sets X 1 and X 2 , each with three items. The valuations of agent i ∈ {1, 2} are given by (all indices are modulo two)
The variable ϵ is a sufficiently small positive number. The valuation v i of agent i is subadditive, but not fractionally subadditive. (The problem for agent i is that the valuation for X i is too high given the valuations for S ⊂ X i .)
The welfare maximizing allocation awards set X 1 to agent 1 and set X 2 to agent 2. The resulting welfare is v 1 (X 1 ) + v 2 (X 2 ) = 12 + 12 = 24.
We claim that the following profile of bids b = (b 1 , b 2 ) can be expressed within OXS and constitutes a PNE:
Given b VCG awards set X 2 to agent 1 and set X 1 to agent 2 for a welfare of v 1 (X 2 ) + v 2 (X 1 ) = 2 · (5 + ϵ ) = 10 + 2ϵ, which is by a factor 2.4 − 12ϵ/(25 + 5ϵ ) smaller than the optimum welfare.
We can express b i as ORs of XORs of XS bids as follows: Let X i = {a, b, c} and X i+1 = {d, e, f }. Let h d , h e , h f and d , e , f be XS bids that value d, e, f at 3 + 3ϵ and 1 − ϵ, respectively. Then
To show that b is a Nash equilibrium we can focus on agent i (by symmetry) and on deviating bids a i that win agent i a subset S of X i (because agent i currently wins X i+1 and v i (S ) = max{v i (S ∩ X 1 ), v i (S ∩ X 2 )} for sets S that intersect both X 1 and X 2 ).
Note that the price that agent i faces on the subsets S of X i are superadditive: For |S | = 1 the price is (5 + ϵ ) − (4 + 2ϵ ) = 1 − ϵ, for |S | = 2 the price is (5 + ϵ ) − (3 + 3ϵ ) = 2 − 2ϵ, and for |S | = 3 the price is 5 + ϵ.
Case 1: S = X i . We claim that this case cannot occur. To see this, observe that because a i ∈ XOS, Lemma 4.7 shows that there must be a two-element subset T of S for which a i (T ) ≥ 2/3 · a i (S ). On the one hand this shows that a i (S ) ≤ 9 because otherwise a i (T ) ≥ 2/3 · a i (S ) > 6 in contradiction to our assumption that a i does not overbid. On the other hand, to ensure that VCG assigns S to agent i we must have a i (S ) ≥ a i (T ) + (3 + 3ϵ ). Thus a i (S ) ≥ 2/3 · a i (S ) + (3 + 3ϵ ) and, hence, a i (S ) ≥ 9(1 + ϵ ). We conclude that 9 ≥ a i (S ) ≥ 9(1 + ϵ ), which gives a contradiction.
Case 2: S ⊂ X i . In this case, agent i's valuation for S is 6 and his payment is at least 1 − ϵ as we have shown above. Thus,
i.e., the utility does not increase with the deviation.
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF EQUILIBRIA
Our final result concerns the computational complexity of finding a PNE. It states that for restrictions from subadditive valuations to additive bids it is N P-hard to decide whether a PNE exists. The same decision problem is simple for fractionally subadditive valuations because pure Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist [6] .
Theorem 5.1. Consider running the VCG mechanism for agents with subadditive valuations and additive bids. Then it is N P-hard to decide whether there exists a PNE.
Proof. We reduce from 3-Partition. Given an instance of 3-Partition consisting of a multiset of 3m positive integers w 1 , . . . ,w 3m ∈ (B/4, B/2) that sum up to mB, we construct an instance of a combinatorial auction in which the agents have subadditive valuations in polynomial time as follows:
The set of agents is B 1 , . . . , B m and C 1 , . . . ,C m . The set of items is I ∪ J , where I =
The valuations for the items in J are motivated by an example for valuations without a PNE in Reference [3] . Note that our valuations are subadditive. We show first that if there is a solution of our 3-Partition instance then the corresponding auction has a PNE. Let us assume that P 1 , . . . , P m is a solution of 3-Partition. We obtain a PNE when every agent B i bids w j for each I j with j ∈ P i and zero for the other items; and every agent C i bids 4B for each item in J i . The first step is to show that no agent B i would change his strategy. The utility of B i is B, because B i 's payment is zero. As the valuation function of B i is the maximum of his valuation for the items in I and the items in J we can study the strategies for I and J separately. If B i changed his bid and won another item in I, B i would have to pay his valuation for this item because there is an agent B j bidding on it, and, thus, his utility would not increase. As B i does not overbid, B i could win at most one item of the items in J i . His value for the item would be 5B, but the payment would be C i 's bid of 4B. Thus, his utility would not be larger than B if B i won an item of J . Hence, B i does not want to change his bid. The second step is to show that no agent C i would change his strategy. This follows since the utility of every agent C i is 16B, and this is the highest utility that C i can obtain.
We will now show two facts that follow if the auction is in a PNE: (1) We first show that in every PNE every agent B i must have a utility of at least B. To see this denote the bids of agent C i for the items J i , J m+i , J 2m+i in J i by c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 and assume w.l.o.g. that c 1 ≤ c 2 ≤ c 3 . As agent C i does not overbid, c 2 + c 3 ≤ 8B, and, thus, c 1 ≤ 4B. If agent B i bade 5B for J i , B i would win J i and his utility would be at least B, because B i has to pay C i 's bid for J i . As B i 's utility in the PNE cannot be worse, his utility in the PNE has to be at least B. (2) Next we show that in a PNE agent B i cannot win any of the items in J i . For a contradiction suppose that agent B i wins at least one of the items in J i by bidding b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 for the items J i , J m+i , J 2m+i in J i . Then agent C i does not win the whole set J i and his utility is at most 8B. As agent B i does not overbid, b i + b j ≤ 5B for i j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, b 1 + b 2 + b 3 ≤ 7.5B. Agent C i can however bid c 1 = b 1 + ϵ, c 2 = b 2 + ϵ, c 3 = b 3 + ϵ for some ϵ > 0 without violating no-overbidding to win all items in J i for a utility of at least 16B − 7.5B > 8B. Thus, C i 's utility increases when C i changes his bid, i.e., the auction is not in a PNE. Now we use facts (1) and (2) to show that our instance of 3-Partition has a solution if the auction has a PNE. Let us assume that the auction is in a PNE. By (1) we know that every agent B i gets at least utility B. Combined with (2) we know that every agent B i wins only items in I, pays zero, and has exactly utility B. Recall that all w e with e ∈ {1, . . . , 3m} satisfy B/4 < w e < B/2. Thus the valuation of an agent B i is larger than 4 · B/4 = B for a subset of I with more than three items and is smaller than 2 · B/2 = B for a subset of I with less than three items. Hence, every bidder B i gets exactly three items in I and the assignment of the items in I corresponds to a solution of 3-Partition.
APPENDIX A RELAXED SMOOTHNESS AND BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this Appendix, we show that relaxed smoothness also implies an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy with respect to Bayes-Nash equilibria. For this result, it is important that valuations are distributed independently. In fact, when valuations are correlated the theorem that we show does not apply.
Definitions. In the incomplete information setting, valuations are drawn independently from not necessarily identical distributions. Denote the distribution from which agent i's valuation is drawn by D i . Let D = D 1 × · · · × D n . Agent i knows his value v i and the distributions D −i from which the other agents' valuations are drawn, but he does not observe the realizations of these random draws.
A collection of possibly randomized bidding functions b i : V i → B i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every agent i, every valuation v i in the support of D i , and every pure deviation b i ∈ B i ,
The Price of Anarchy with respect to mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria is the ratio between the expected optimal social welfare and the expected welfare of the worst mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Theorem. We are now ready to prove that relaxed smoothness also implies a bound on the Price of Anarchy for Bayes-Nash equilibria.
Theorem A.1. If a mechanism M = ( f , p) is relaxed (λ, μ 1 , μ 2 ) -smooth then the Price of Anarchy for mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria is at most
Proof. Consider a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium b. For each agent i let B −i denote the distribution over bids b −i ∈ B −i induced by b −i and D −i . Let B denote the distribution over bids b ∈ B induced by b and D.
In the Bayesian setting, Definition 4.1 is not directly applicable because the deviating bid a i in this definition may depend on v −i , which is not known to agent i. What we will do instead is the
